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Abstract 1 
 2 
Cooperation often comes with the temptation to defect and benefit at the cost of others. This 3 
tension between cooperation and defection is best captured in social dilemmas like the 4 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Adult humans have specific strategies to maintain cooperation during 5 
Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions. Yet, little is known about the ontogenetic and phylogenetic 6 
origins of human decision-making strategies in conflict scenarios. To shed light on this question, 7 
we compared the strategies used by chimpanzees and 5-year old children to overcome a social 8 
dilemma. In our task, waiting for the partner to act first produced the best results for the subject. 9 
Alternatively, they could mutually cooperate and divide the rewards. Our findings indicate that 10 
the two species differed substantially in their strategies to solve the task.  Chimpanzees became 11 
more strategic across the study period by waiting longer to act in the social dilemma. Children 12 
developed a more efficient strategy of taking turns to reciprocate their rewards. Moreover, 13 
children used specific types of communication to coordinate with their partners. These results 14 
suggest that while both species behaved strategically to overcome a conflict situation, only 15 
children engaged in active cooperation to solve a social dilemma. 16 
 17 
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1. Introduction 31 
 32 
Cooperation is a widespread phenomenon in nature: from unicellular organisms to human 33 
societies, evolutionary complexity can only be explained through cooperative processes in which 34 
biological entities work together to achieve common benefits (Smith and Szathmary, 1995). 35 
Sometimes cooperation is the best strategy for all agents (Boucher, 1988; Clutton-Brock, 2009) 36 
but on other occasions cooperation comes together with the possibility to defect and reap the 37 
benefits from the cooperative acts of others. This tension between cooperation and defection 38 
is best captured by social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980). A well-known example is the Prisoner’s 39 
Dilemma model (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Tucker, 1950). This model describes a scenario 40 
in which two players can either cooperate or defect. Mutual cooperation is always better than 41 
mutual defection. However, for the individual player it is always better to defect regardless of 42 
the other player’s decision, leading to mutual defection if both play rationally. To solve this 43 
conundrum, theoretical analyses have proposed different strategies such as “tit for tat”, an 44 
effective strategy in which each player will first cooperate and then subsequently replicate the 45 
partners’ previous action (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993). 46 
However, these theoretical findings contrast with experimental research showing that people 47 
tend to cooperate more than expected in a wide range of Prisoner’s Dilemmas, including one-48 
shot interactions (Cooper et al., 1996; Kiyonari et al., 2000) and iterated versions of the dilemma 49 
(Cooper et al., 1996; Dal Bo and Frechette, 2011; Wedekind and Milinski, 1996). This is consistent 50 
with results from other games such as the Dictator and the Ultimatum Game in which people 51 
tend to behave altruistically towards others (Camerer, 2003; Heinrich et al., 2001, although see 52 
Smith and Silberberg, 2010). 53 
Humans possess uniquely cooperative motivations to help and share with others from a young 54 
age (Brownell et al., 2013; Liszkowski et al., 2006; Warneken and Tomasello, 2006). We already 55 
deviate from the rational assumptions of the Ultimatum (Bueno-Guerra et al., 2016; Wittig et 56 
al., 2013) and the Dictator Games (Benenson et al., 2007) as children. To our knowledge, only 57 
two studies have investigated how children solve a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Matsumoto et al. (1986) 58 
presented four-year-old children with a simplified version of the dilemma. In that task, pairs of 59 
children had to choose between competition or cooperation cards and the rewards they would 60 
obtain were determined according to the Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix. During the task 61 
children were encouraged to discuss their strategies. Overall, the authors found that children 62 
increased their likelihood to mutually cooperate across sessions and that the degree of 63 
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friendship was positively related with mutual cooperation. A more recent study with 64 
considerably older children (Blake et al., 2015) presented 10- and 11-year-old children with an 65 
anonymous computer-based Prisoner’s Dilemma game. They found that children cooperated 66 
more often in iterated versions of the dilemma in comparison to one-shot interactions. These 67 
results suggest that the adult patterns of decision making in social dilemmas are already present 68 
at a young age.  69 
Such cooperative behaviour towards non-kin in social dilemmas is an important feature of 70 
human evolution but very little experimental work has been done on how closely related species 71 
respond to these dilemmas. The Prisoner’s Dilemma model has been used to investigate the 72 
nature of animal cooperation —whether different social interactions could be understood as 73 
instances of the Prisoner Dilemma (Dugatkin, 1988; Raihani and Bshary, 2011; Wilkinson, 1984). 74 
But, other than few studies with distantly related species (Stephens et al., 2002; Wood et al., 75 
2016), little emphasis has been placed in using the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a framework to explore 76 
in detail the proximate decision-making strategies that social animals such as great apes require 77 
to resolve situations of conflict. 78 
Like humans, great apes such as chimpanzees often face conflict situations in their daily lives; 79 
situations that can be interpreted as social dilemmas like the Prisoner’s Dilemma. For instance, 80 
chimpanzees may want other group members to take action during cooperative hunts or during 81 
intergroup aggression. Thus, from a comparative perspective it is of special interest to compare 82 
the decision-making strategies of our closest living relatives, the chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), 83 
with those of children in social dilemmas. Comparing these two populations in non-trivial 84 
scenarios, as it might be for human adults, can tell us more about cooperative problem solving 85 
and its evolution. Furthermore, the study of children in these types of tasks can shed light on 86 
the ontogeny of human cooperative strategies. Taken together, this approach contributes to our 87 
understanding of the evolutionary roots of human cooperation and decision-making.  88 
There has been a considerable amount of experimental studies on cooperation in apes, in 89 
particular chimpanzees.  This work shows overall, that chimpanzees cooperate with each other 90 
when this strategy leads to the best outcomes for themselves (Bullinger et al., 2011; Duguid et 91 
al., 2014; Hirata and Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006). When it comes to situations in which 92 
chimpanzees can distribute resources between themselves and a partner, such as the Dictator 93 
game, they tend to benefit themselves whenever possible. So much so that Jensen and 94 
colleagues describe chimpanzees as “rational maximizers” (i.e. employing strategies to maximize 95 
their rewards regardless of others; e.g. Jensen et al., 2007; Jensen, 2016; Silk et al., 2005; but 96 
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see e.g. Proctor et al., 2013 and Schmelz et al., 2017 for evidence of chimpanzees making 97 
prosocial choices at a cost to themselves).  98 
As well as showing some ability to coordinate actions for mutual benefit (such as in a Stag Hunt 99 
game; Bullinger et al., 2011a; Duguid et al., 2014), chimpanzees can also coordinate when 100 
conflicts of interest arise. For example, chimpanzees and bonobos can negotiate unequal reward 101 
distributions in the Snowdrift game (Sudgen, 1986) and avoid the complete breakdown of 102 
cooperation and thus avoid complete loss of rewards (Melis et al., 2009; Sánchez-Amaro et al., 103 
2016, 2017). Notably, in contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in the Snowdrift game if the partner 104 
defects, cooperation leads to a better outcome than defection. Thus, the question arises: would 105 
chimpanzees and children still be able to coordinate their actions in a social dilemma when 106 
unilateral cooperation is not beneficial for co-operators, as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma? In other 107 
words, can chimpanzees and children avoid mutual defection when cooperation comes with the 108 
risk of losing all rewards to another?  109 
To answer our question, we investigated the strategies chimpanzees and five-year old children 110 
use to solve a social dilemma inspired by the Prisoner´s Dilemma. We created the dilemma using 111 
an apparatus consisting of a rectangular tray positioned between the two subjects, baited with 112 
one reward at either end. The tray could be moved up and down via ropes attached at either 113 
end (one accessible to each subject). In the social dilemma condition (Figure 1a), the tray started 114 
at the bottom. When only one subject pulled their rope (i.e. that individual cooperates), their 115 
side of the tray moved upwards and all rewards rolled down to the partner–the worst possible 116 
outcome. An individual’s best strategy was to wait for their partner to pull from the rope and 117 
then obtain all the rewards (i.e. defection). Alternatively, they could pull together and share the 118 
rewards once the tray reached the top position (i.e. mutual cooperation). Finally, if neither 119 
individual pulled the rope within 15 seconds (i.e. mutual defection) they both lost access to the 120 
rewards after.  121 
Our social dilemma shares with the Prisoner’s Dilemma two main features. Namely, that 122 
defection on a cooperative partner leads to better outcomes than mutual cooperation and that 123 
mutual cooperation is better than mutual defection. However, both dilemmas differed in two 124 
important aspects. First, in our social dilemma mutual cooperation resulted in the same number 125 
of rewards as a turn-taking strategy (individuals alternating between cooperation and defection) 126 
rather than more as in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Second, for an individual mutual 127 
defection and unilateral cooperation both resulted in no rewards.  128 
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We compared behaviour in this dilemma to a competitive situation, using the same apparatus. 129 
In this condition (Figure 1b), the tray started at the top position and the subject could obtain all 130 
the rewards by pulling faster than his partner. In competitive trials pairs of chimpanzees and 131 
children could also pull together and divide the rewards once the tray reached the bottom 132 
position (Figure 1c and Table 1 for a representation of the payoff matrix of both games).  133 
Subjects were able to see each other and communicate freely throughout the task. This method 134 
deviates from traditional game-theoretical studies (Blake et al., 2011; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; 135 
Bouas and Komorita, 1996) in which individuals play with strangers and are not allowed to 136 
communicate. Instead it mirrors more recent studies using game-theoretical paradigms to 137 
investigate the scope of human and non-human animals’ abilities to cooperate in more 138 
naturalistic situations (Brosnan et al., 2011; Duguid et al., 2014; Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2017; 139 
McClung et al., 2017). Importantly, the dynamic nature of the task meant that even if individuals 140 
initially pulled together during a social dilemma trial, any individual could turn it into a 141 
competitive trial by ceasing to pull –causing the rewards to roll down to the side of the defector 142 
just as in competitive trials. This, feature deviates from other cooperative games in which 143 
unilateral acts are never rewarded (Duguid et al., 2014; Melis et al., 2009). 144 
In line with previous studies (Melis et al., 2009; Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2016, 2017), we expect 145 
chimpanzees to behave strategically (e.g. waiting longer for their partners to pull) to maximize 146 
their rewards. Therefore, we expect high levels of mutual defection and loss of rewards in 147 
chimpanzees as a result of their longer latencies to retrieve the rewards (after 15 seconds the 148 
rewards were removed from the tray). In contrast, based on previous findings (Grueneisen and 149 
Tomasello, 2016; Melis et al., 2016), we expect five-year old children to engage in cooperative 150 
strategies to divide the rewards while maintaining high levels of cooperation. 151 
 152 
2. Methods 153 
 154 
2.1 Subjects 155 
We tested 14 captive chimpanzees (7 males; Mage= 21.1 years; see table 1 in ESM) housed at the 156 
Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center in Leipzig zoo and 20 pairs of 5- to 5.5-year old 157 
children (10 pairs of boys and 10 pairs of girls) in kindergartens in the Leipzig area. Pairs of 158 
children were always from the same kindergarten and thus, familiar to each other.  159 
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During the first test phase of the study, the chimpanzees made up 7 unique pairs. After phase 160 
one, ten chimpanzees completed four cooperative training sessions with a human experimenter 161 
before they were tested again with the same partner for the second test phase. The remaining 162 
four subjects could not participate further as two individuals (from different pairs) moved to 163 
another zoo. 164 
  165 
2.2 Ethics statement 166 
The study was ethically approved by an internal committee at the Max Planck Institute for 167 
Evolutionary Anthropology. The study complies with the ‘EAZA Minimum Standards for the 168 
Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos and Aquaria’, the ‘WAZA Ethical Guidelines for the 169 
Conduct of Research on Animals by Zoos and Aquariums’ and the ASAB/ABS ‘Guidelines for the 170 
Treatment of Animals in Behavioural Research and Teaching’. Children studies were carried out 171 
with the written informed consent of the participants, and in accordance with all applicable laws 172 
and rules governing psychological research in Germany. 173 
 174 
2.3 Materials 175 
The ape apparatus consisted of a rectangular tray (91x10cm) positioned between the two 176 
subjects (Figure 1). The apparatus was completely visible from both subjects’ perspective. The 177 
tray could move vertically in the space between the two subjects. A rope was connected at either 178 
end of the tray so that each subject could pull from one end of the rope. The tray was baited 179 
with a grape at each end. The tray could either start at the bottom of the vertical space (social 180 
dilemma condition) or at the top (competitive condition). If one ape pulled the rope in the social 181 
dilemma condition, the tray would lift from the pulled end and tilt so that both grapes would 182 
roll down to the other side, where a partner could retrieve them (Figure 1a). In contrast, if one 183 
ape pulled in the competitive condition, that end of the tray would drop from the top position 184 
and the tray would tilt so that the grapes would roll down to the puller’s side (Figure 1b). 185 
Therefore, pulling during social dilemma trials was defined as cooperation while pulling in 186 
competitive trials was defined as competition. Not pulling in social dilemma trials was defined as 187 
defection. Alternatively, in both conditions chimpanzees could coordinate their actions to pull 188 
from their ropes simultaneously, moving the tray up (in the social dilemma condition) or down 189 
(in the competitive condition) while maintaining the horizontal position of the tray (i.e. mutual 190 
cooperation). Upon reaching the top or bottom each individual could access one grape (Figure 191 
1c). Subjects could adjust their pulling actions until the rewards rolled down (above an angle of 192 
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approx. 20 degrees) or they could retrieve the rewards from the upper or lower windows. See 193 
also Figure 1 in the Electronic Supplementary Material (ESM) for an example of the children’s 194 
apparatus. 195 
The mechanism that allowed the tray to be raised and lowered consisted of a Plexiglas tower 196 
(65cm high) at either end of the tray. The end of the tray rested on two brackets that could slide 197 
up and down the towers. The position of the brackets (and thus the tray) was maintained, when 198 
there was no force on the rope, by counterweights —metal cylinders of 0.5kg— attached to the 199 
brackets.  200 
Each Plexiglas tower was attached to a Plexiglas frame. The Plexiglas frames had two windows, 201 
one at the top and another at the bottom position that could be opened or closed by the 202 
experimenters, depending on the condition and whether the chimpanzees were allowed to 203 
access the ends of the tray. Under the apparatus there were two ramps, down which the grapes 204 
rolled to within reach of the chimpanzees in their respective cages.  205 
The ropes were connected to its corresponding bracket through a system of pulleys that allowed 206 
the vertical movement of the elevators along the towers when the subjects pulled.  The baited 207 
rewards could be accessed from three different locations: directly from the tray through the 208 
windows at the top or at the bottom position, or from the ramps under the apparatus. 209 
In general, pairs of children were presented with the same task as chimpanzees. The apparatus 210 
was built inside a box made of wood and Plexiglas that prevented children from directly 211 
accessing the rewards (60x42x50 cm; vertical towers were 36.5 cm high). The front side of the 212 
box was open to allow Experimenter 1 (henceforth E1 and E2 for the second experimenter) 213 
access to the apparatus. The box was placed on the ground between both children. Children 214 
collected glass marbles as rewards instead of food. They collected their rewards in opaque 215 
plastic containers. Therefore, it was difficult for children to keep track of their rewards once 216 
inside the box containers to make it more similar to the apes, which ate the rewards 217 
immediately. 218 
  219 
2.4 Procedure and Design 220 
Chimpanzees and children were tested in a within-subjects design in the social dilemma and the 221 
competitive conditions. Subjects could either pull (i.e. unilateral cooperation) or do nothing (i.e. 222 
to defect) in social dilemma trials, and pull (i.e. to compete) or do nothing and lose the rewards 223 
during competitive trials. If only one individual acted, the rewards would fall onto the ramps and 224 
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could be collected from under the tray. If both individuals coordinated during social dilemma 225 
trials (tray at the lower position), they would lift the tray from the bottom position and obtain 226 
the rewards through the top windows. In contrast, in competitive trials (tray at the top position) 227 
subjects would pull down the tray from the top position to obtain the rewards through the lower 228 
windows. At the start of a test session, one experimenter opened either the top windows for 229 
social dilemma trials or the lower windows for competitive trials. At the start of a trial, one 230 
reward was baited at each end of the tray. The subjects then had 15 seconds to act. After this 231 
time, an experimenter would remove any rewards left on the tray.  232 
Each pair of chimpanzees completed 16 test sessions separated into two test phases of eight 233 
sessions. Each phase contained four sessions per condition. Each condition was presented in a 234 
block of four sessions per phase (e.g. four competitive sessions followed by four social dilemma 235 
sessions). In the case of children, each pair performed one test session per condition (see details 236 
of the test’ instructions in the ESM). The order of conditions was counterbalanced between 237 
pairs. Chimpanzees switched sides of the apparatus between sessions while children swapped 238 
sides half-way through each session (fourth trial). In the case of chimpanzees, after the 239 
cooperation training, each pair was tested for another eight test sessions (test phase 2). These 240 
pairs started the second test phase with the condition they finished the first test phase. 241 
 242 
2.5 Training 243 
Before the test sessions, both species completed several training phases to understand the task 244 
contingencies. Chimpanzees conducted an individual training phase that demonstrated the 245 
payoff contingencies of the task and how to access the rewards. Children took part in a short 246 
pre-training phase in which they could see how the apparatus functioned. Subsequently, both 247 
species engaged in a social training phase. In this training phase we demonstrated that, 248 
depending on the condition, individuals could gain or lose rewards by either pulling themselves 249 
or by waiting for a partner to pull –in the case of chimpanzees the partner was a human stooge 250 
while children performed this training phase with their peers. In addition, chimpanzees took 251 
part in coordination training between the two test phases. The purpose of this training was to 252 
show chimpanzees that they could potentially coordinate their actions with their partner and 253 
divide the rewards —by pulling together with a human experimenter and subsequently 254 
accessing the rewards through the windows. Children only participated in one test session. 255 
Therefore, we did not present them with the coordination training. The inclusion of this training 256 
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before the test would have prevented comparisons between species. See more details of the 257 
different training phases for each specie in the ESM. 258 
 259 
2.6 Coding 260 
We scored four dependent measures: efficiency, latency to pull, pulling rates (including 261 
individual strategies derived from individual pulling rates) and whether subjects coordinated 262 
their actions within trials. Efficiency was defined as the proportion of trials in which at least one 263 
member of a pair was successful at retrieving at least one reward. Latency was the elapsed time 264 
between the experimenters baiting the rewards on the tray until the first pulling action 265 
occurred. A pulling action was the first movement (upwards or downwards, depending on 266 
condition) of either end of the tray. Coordination was defined as trials in which both individuals 267 
pulled together and split their rewards (i.e. mutual cooperation).  268 
From the pulling rates —regardless of the reward distribution— we calculated the proportion of 269 
strategic decisions: competing in competitive trials and defection in social dilemma trials. This 270 
was used as a basis for classifying subjects in three qualitative categories: strategisers as subjects 271 
that obtained rewards at rates significantly above chance in both conditions (chance level set at 272 
50%) by competing in competitive and defecting in social dilemma conditions, pullers pulling in 273 
at least 75% of trials in both conditions and non-pullers pulling in 25% or less of the trials in both 274 
conditions. The subjects not placed in any of these three categories were counted as 275 
unclassified. 276 
In addition to the previous measures, we examined whether children verbally communicated 277 
during the task. We focused on three types of communication. Imperatives: deontic verbs used 278 
to direct their partner’s actions; informatives: communication aimed at informing partners 279 
about a child’s current or intended actions; and protests: statements of disapproval and 280 
objection about a partner action’s or intention. Moreover, we coded pointing gestures towards 281 
partners. For every trial, we coded whether children pairs communicated (by either one or both 282 
children) and whether each of the four categories of communication (imperative, protests, 283 
informative and pointing gestures) occurred within a trial (by either one or both children).  284 
Communication was scored from the moment E1 showed the rewards to the children until the 285 
children inserted their rewards into their boxes. In the case of chimpanzees, throughout coding 286 
and testing no communication was noted by the experimenter (as was the case in previous 287 
studies; Sanchez-Amaro et al., 2017). However, the visibility from the camera angles was not 288 
clear enough to confirm this with an acceptable level of certainty. Thus, the authors 289 
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acknowledge that we cannot make strong conclusions about the role of communication for 290 
chimpanzees in this task. 291 
 292 
2.7 Statistical details 293 
The main analyses included in this study were conducted using Linear Mixed models (LMM) and 294 
Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) (Baayen et al., 2008) and were run using R statistics 295 
(version 3.1.1). We ran all LMM with Gaussian error structure and identity link function and all 296 
GLMM with binomial structure and logit link function. All continuous variables were z-297 
transformed when required.  298 
All full models were compared to a null model excluding all the test variables. Only when the 299 
comparison between the full and the null model was significant we further investigated the 300 
significance of the test variables. The drop1 function of the lme4 package (Bates, 2010) was used 301 
to test each variable’s significance (including possible interactions between test predictors).  302 
Non-significant interactions were removed to produce a new reduced model.  A likelihood ratio 303 
test with significance set at p < 0.05 was used to compare models and to test the significance of 304 
the individual fixed effects (Barr et al., 2013). The 95% confidence intervals (CI) of the reduced 305 
models were calculated when appropriate.  306 
To rule out collinearity, Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were checked (Field, 2005). All VIF values 307 
were close to 1. For every model, model stability was assessed by comparing the estimates 308 
derived by a model based on all data with those obtained from models with the levels of the 309 
random effects excluded one at a time. All models were stable. In linear mixed models it is not 310 
possible to obtain effect sizes for each predictor. It is only possible to report size effects for the 311 
effect sizes as a whole (or fixed and random effects together) (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013; 312 
Nakagawa et al., 2017). These general effect sizes were not considered informative for the 313 
purpose of these studies and were not reported. 314 
Besides the main analysis (LMM and GLMM), we performed additional analysis when necessary 315 
(binomial tests and correlation analysis) using R statistics (version 3.1.1). 316 
 317 
 318 
 319 
 320 
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3. Results 321 
 322 
Overall, at least one individual of the pair obtained rewards in a majority of trials (89% 323 
chimpanzees; 95% children). While all unsuccessful trials (mutual defection) by chimpanzees 324 
occurred in the social dilemma condition (22% trials), children’s failures where divided between 325 
conditions (6% of competitive trials and 2% of social dilemma trials). We found that both species 326 
waited longer to act in the social dilemma condition compared to the competitive condition. 327 
Chimpanzees were more likely to wait before pulling in social dilemma trials compared to 328 
competitive trials (2
1
 = 7.33, N= 720, p = 0.007). In trials in which they did wait, they waited 329 
longer to pull in the social dilemma condition and decreased their latencies to pull in the 330 
competitive condition across sessions (2
1
 = 12.51, N= 720, p < 0.001; Figure 2) and trials (2
1
 = 331 
12.58, N= 720, p < 0.001; Figure 2). The average latency to first pull during social dilemma trials 332 
was 2.95 seconds (SE = 0.17 seconds), in comparison, to 0.63 seconds (SE = 0.06 seconds) during 333 
competitive trials. Children, in contrast, became faster across sessions in both conditions (2
1
 = 334 
7.94, N = 303, p = 0.005) but did wait longer overall to pull during social dilemma trials (2
1
 = 6.15, 335 
N= 303, p = 0.013). The average latency to first pull by child dyads during social dilemma trials 336 
(2.93 seconds, SE = 0.19 seconds) was slightly longer than in competitive trials (2.34 seconds, SE 337 
= 0.18 seconds).  338 
Pulling rates indicated that 29% of chimpanzees behaved strategically according to our 339 
classifications, i.e., pulling mainly in competitive but not in social dilemma trials (binomial tests, 340 
N =56-128 trials, p < 0.005; see Figure 3). In contrast, only 4% of children were classified as 341 
strategic (binomial tests, N = 16 trials, p < 0.005; see Figure 3). Instead, children took turns to 342 
reciprocate their rewards. We found that children were much more likely to take turns than 343 
predicted by chance (children took turns in 73% of trials; Intercept: estimate = 1.01, SE = 0.45, p 344 
< 0.001), irrespective of the condition presented and their experience with the task (2
4
 = 2.363, 345 
N = 211, p = 0.669).  346 
There was a strong correlation between the proportion of strategic choices that chimpanzees 347 
made and the number of rewards they obtained: the most strategic individuals tended to 348 
maximize their gains (r = 0.83). This correlation was moderate in children (r = 0.5), perhaps as a 349 
result of their general tendency to reciprocate the rewards in both conditions. 350 
Both children and chimpanzees mutually cooperated (i.e. pulled simultaneously and divide the 351 
rewards) in a small number of trials (10.6% chimpanzees; 6% children). Chimpanzees divided the 352 
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rewards mainly in competitive trials (95% of cases simultaneous pulling occurred in the 353 
competitive condition), perhaps as a by-product of both individuals competing to obtain all the 354 
rewards. However, when they pulled simultaneously, they did so more often after the 2nd phase 355 
of the study, after they had participated in a coordination training with a human partner (2
1
 = 356 
5.61, N = 759, p = 0.018)—65% of trials in which chimpanzees coordinated for mutual 357 
cooperation occurred in the 2nd phase of the study. Children did not participate in coordination 358 
trials. They were equally likely to mutually cooperate in both conditions to divide their rewards. 359 
Finally, children verbally communicated about their current or impending actions in 32% of 360 
trials. They tended to communicate more often during social dilemma trials (2
4
 = 8.75, N = 320, 361 
p = 0.068), using mainly imperative (e.g. “you must pull”) and informative (e.g. “I pull this time”) 362 
forms of verbal communication in both conditions (see methods section). See ESM for 363 
information on models and binomial tests.  364 
4. Discussion 365 
 366 
The results of the current study demonstrate that chimpanzees and children are able to solve 367 
(i.e. avoid mutual defection) a social dilemma in which unilateral cooperation leads to the loss 368 
of rewards, but they differ in their strategies to do so.  369 
Similarly to previous studies exploring children’s behaviour in the other Prisoner’s Dilemmas and 370 
other conflicts of interest (Blake et al., 2011; Grueneisen and Tomasello, 2016; Matsumoto et 371 
al., 1986; Melis et al., 2016), children in our study engaged in turn-taking to overcome repeatedly 372 
presented conflicts of interest. Although children in our study, unlike previous studies, had the 373 
possibility to coordinate their actions by acting together and dividing the rewards in each trial—374 
a strategy that would have resulted in the same rewards as perfect turn-taking—they rarely did 375 
so.  There are several reasons that may explain their preference for turn-taking over mutual 376 
cooperation. 377 
First, during training children only experienced pulling alone, not pulling with a partner. This 378 
could have hindered exploration of further strategies (i.e., mutual cooperation). However, 20% 379 
of pairs divided the rewards at least once in either the social dilemma or the competitive 380 
condition although no pair mutually cooperated in more than half of their trials. Second, in our 381 
task mutual cooperation might have been more demanding than turn-taking in terms of 382 
coordinated sensorimotor and planning abilities (Vesper et al., 2016). In particular, children 383 
needed to carefully time their actions to achieve and maintain the horizontal position of the tray 384 
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to access the rewards. Moreover, due to the dynamic nature of the task, children may have tried 385 
to avoid the potential risk of cheating during mutual collaboration–when both individuals pull 386 
together in a social dilemma trial one can always stop pulling and obtain all the rewards. By 387 
taking turns, children simultaneously reduced sensorimotor demands derived from coordination 388 
and avoided potential cheating within trials but still demonstrated a sense of trust in their 389 
collaborative partner by reciprocating. Evidence from other studies has shown that 5-year-old 390 
children are capable of forming joint goals based on a mutual sense of “strategic trust” (Hamann 391 
et al., 2012; Tomasello, 2016) in which both individuals understand what they must do to 392 
achieve joint success. Thus, in this task children did not need to mutually coordinate their actions 393 
with their partners to solve the task if they mutually trusted each other. The ability to 394 
communicate may have contributed to enhanced trust between children, as suggested by recent 395 
findings in adults (Cohen et al., 2010).  However, we should emphasize that although we are not 396 
aware of studies comparing the strategies of children from different cultures in these types of 397 
games, previous work has highlighted the use of different strategies to distribute collaborative 398 
outcomes among children of different cultures (Schaffer et al., 2015; Zeidler et al., 2016). Thus, 399 
it is possible that children from other populations may use different cooperative strategies to 400 
distribute rewards (i.e. division of rewards by the end of the game). 401 
Although children used a turn-taking strategy to cooperate in both types of conditions, they did 402 
distinguish between them. Children waited longer to pull in social dilemma trials compared to 403 
competitive trials. Yet, overall, children tended to decrease their latencies to pull across sessions. 404 
This might have been the product of the turn-taking strategy –once a turn-taking strategy was 405 
established, there was little need to wait for the partner to pull in either condition. With 406 
increasing experience, it is likely that children better understood the contingencies of the game 407 
and thus were faster to operate the apparatus. 408 
Finally, we found that children communicated slightly more often during social dilemma 409 
compared to competitive trials, but this difference was not significant. This might be partially 410 
explained by the fact that children solved both situations similarly: they took turns equally across 411 
conditions and became faster across the study period. This might also explain why, in general, 412 
children used similar types of communication across conditions. This finding contrasts with 413 
other studies showing that children flexibly adjust their communication between conditions of 414 
a game (when either the risk of coordination failure or competing interests vary between 415 
conditions) to achieve successful coordination (Duguid et al., 2014; Sánchez-Amaro et al., 2017). 416 
One possibility is that, given the competitive nature of the social dilemma, communication did 417 
not have a big effect in their partners’ decisions and so, they adjusted their communication to a 418 
15 | P a g e  
 
lesser degree compared to situations without a conflict of interest in which communication plays 419 
an important role in coordinating decisions (e.g. Duguid et al., 2014). This interpretation would 420 
be consistent with findings with adults showing that communication has a stronger effect on 421 
their partners’ decisions in mutually cooperative context, such as the Stag Hunt, compared to 422 
more competitive situations, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Duffy and Feltovich, 2002).  423 
Chimpanzees were also able to distinguish the social dilemma from the competitive situation. 424 
They behaved more strategically with experience, waiting longer for their partners to pull by the 425 
end of the study in the social dilemma condition. They also became faster across sessions in the 426 
competitive condition, further implying that they learned the contingencies of the study and 427 
adapted their behaviour to maximize their own rewards over time.  428 
Chimpanzees did not collaborate to solve the task and divide the benefits. Instead, they waited 429 
for their partner to pull; the only strategy that could lead them to maximize their rewards. The 430 
lack of collaboration cannot be explained by a general inability to cooperate for mutual benefits: 431 
across several cooperative experimental set-ups, chimpanzees have proven to be skilful 432 
collaborators (Duguid et al., 2014; Melis et al., 2006). Even when conflicts of interest arise or 433 
unilateral cooperation lead to rewards for both members of a pair (Melis et al., 2009; Sánchez-434 
Amaro et al., 2016). Our results are perhaps better understood in the context of chimpanzees 435 
acting as rational maximizers to increase their own benefits as suggested by Jensen and 436 
colleagues (2007). According to this idea, chimpanzees only cooperate if this strategy leads to 437 
the highest possible rewards for themselves. It is also not surprising, therefore, that in our task 438 
most of the coordination occurred during competitive trials. This outcome likely resulted from 439 
both chimpanzees pulling at the same time in an attempt to maximize their own rewards. In 440 
fact, chimpanzees almost never collaborate in social dilemma trials even after the cooperative 441 
training. In social dilemma trials, unlike in competitive trials, chimpanzees could always defect 442 
(i.e., stop pulling at any time while their partner pulls). This risk of losing all the rewards might 443 
have prevented chimpanzees from collaborating during social dilemma trials. Additionally, it is 444 
possible that the level of motor coordination required might have reduced the likelihood of 445 
mutual cooperation. Chimpanzees could have maximized their rewards by taking turns to pull 446 
across trials —as the children did. However, consistent with previous findings (Melis et al., 2016), 447 
they did not develop any clear turn-taking strategy, adding to the evidence that chimpanzees, 448 
in experimental tasks, do not engage in direct reciprocity to maximize their rewards (Amici et 449 
al., 2014; Brosnan et al., 2009; Melis et al., 2008). 450 
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As expected, chimpanzees failed to obtain the rewards (i.e. mutual defection) in a substantial 451 
amount of social dilemma trials (in 22% of trials). Interestingly enough, chimpanzee dyads still 452 
managed to maintain cooperation even when this resulted in unbalanced payoffs between 453 
individuals: chimpanzees who benefited the most within a pair obtained 81% of the rewards 454 
during social dilemma trials while the most successful children obtained 58.5% of the total 455 
rewards in that condition (see tables 5 and 6 in ESM). This leads to the question of why an 456 
individual would continue to pull for no reward. One possible interpretation of these results is 457 
that chimpanzees pulled because there was a possibility of reward: in 30% of successful social 458 
dilemma trials both individuals pulled to some extent and first pullers obtained rewards in 53% 459 
of these trials. This interpretation only makes sense if we take into account the dynamic nature 460 
of the task: once both individuals were pulling, subjects could turn a social dilemma trial into a 461 
competitive one by ceasing to pull or held the rope steady while the partner continued to pull –462 
their side of the tray would fall and all the rewards would roll down to them. So, initiating action 463 
but not pulling enough for the rewards to roll to their partner can lead to success.  Therefore, 464 
chimpanzees preferred to take those risks in an attempt to increase their own benefits, in 465 
contrast to children who might have avoided collaboration due to the extra risks of losing 466 
rewards. This strategy is more viable in our social dilemma because the punishment for being a 467 
sucker (pulling for another) is the same as mutual defection unlike in a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma 468 
where being a sucker is worse than mutual defection. 469 
An alternative possibility is that chimpanzees acted prosocially towards their partners. This 470 
interpretation would be consistent with results showing that chimpanzees help others to obtain 471 
benefits (Horner et al., 2011; Melis et al., 2011; Schmelz et al., 2017; Yamamoto et al., 2009; 472 
2012; but see Amici et al., 2014 and Tennie et al., 2016). However, this interpretation needs to 473 
be made with caution; in previous studies chimpanzees helped partners mainly when there was 474 
no possibility to obtain food for themselves. In our study the two chimpanzees that obtained 475 
fewer rewards for themselves were paired with the two most dominant and strategic 476 
individuals; these subjects may have refrained from engaging in competitive interactions with 477 
dominant group members, only pulling when the dominant partner did not pull. In addition, if 478 
chimpanzees were acting prosocially we would not expect them to wait longer to pull in social 479 
dilemma trials compared to competitive trials. 480 
It is also possible that some chimpanzees, despite understanding the contingencies of the task, 481 
could not inhibit pulling in a situation in which they had no alternative. However, this seems 482 
unlikely to explain all cases of unilateral cooperation. Many previous studies have shown that 483 
chimpanzees from different labs can inhibit acting for longer periods of time (i.e., 3 minutes) to 484 
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obtain a preferred reward in non-social contexts (Amici et al., 2008; Beran and Evans, 2006; 485 
Rosati et al., 2007) and in social contexts (Bullinger et al., 2011b; Duguid et al., 2014; Melis et 486 
al., 2009). Trials in our study lasted a maximum of 15 seconds, below that of most of the studies 487 
cited.  488 
By using a social dilemma inspired by the Prisoner’s Dilemma to further investigate the strategies 489 
chimpanzees and children use to overcome conflict situations, we found significant differences 490 
between species. Children seemed to be sensitive to the specific nature of the social dilemma. 491 
They adjusted their decisions in a similar way to adults in these scenarios–cooperating across 492 
iterated presentations of the social dilemma and using verbal communication to coordinate 493 
their decisions. Overall, the increased latency to act in social dilemma trials is consistent with 494 
chimpanzees trying to maximise their rewards. Some chimpanzees clearly acted strategically to 495 
maximize their rewards by pulling mainly in competitive but not in social dilemma trials. Others 496 
appeared to behave prosocially by unilaterally pulling in the social dilemma condition. However, 497 
this behaviour was a relatively low risk way to gain potential rewards, thus is not necessarily 498 
prosocially motivated. This is in line with previous literature suggesting that chimpanzees use 499 
strategies to maximize their benefits—even if such strategies lead to unbalanced pay-offs 500 
between participants—rather than developing sustainable cooperative solutions to social 501 
dilemmas. 502 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a key model for the study of the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod 503 
and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993). In this study we created a social dilemma with 504 
two important features in common with the Prisoner’s Dilemma; we could then compare the 505 
strategies that children and chimpanzees use to solve this conflict of interest.  The results of this 506 
comparison shed light onto the ontogenetic and phylogenetic evolution of human cooperation. 507 
We find more evidence that humans from childhood develop the means to find collaborative, 508 
equitable solutions to social dilemmas. In contrast, although chimpanzees do not elaborate 509 
these cooperative strategies and are more likely to fail, they do avoid complete loss of rewards 510 
resulting in a more imbalanced solution. In all, the results are consistent with the hypothesis 511 
that, at some point in our evolutionary history, humans began to depend heavily (in comparison 512 
to other social primates) on their collaborative partners to survive (Tomasello et al., 2012; 513 
Sterelny, 2016), giving rise to the selection of skills for collaboration in contemporary humans. 514 
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Figures and Tables  captions 531 
 532 
Figure 1. Experimental set-up of the study with chimpanzees’ social dilemma condition (1a), 533 
competitive condition (1b) and collaboration example (1c). See Figure 1 in ESM for a 534 
representation of the children set-up. 535 
Figure 2.  Chimpanzee latency of the 1st puller to pull the rope in social dilemma (SD) and 536 
competitive trials (COM) across sessions (left) and across trials (right). Latencies in seconds are 537 
presented on a logarithmic scale. 538 
Figure 3. Proportion of strategic choices in both social dilemma and competitive trials for all 539 
subjects of the two species. The most strategic individuals in both conditions are in the top-right 540 
corner of the plot. The size of the dots represents frequencies of subjects for different scores. 541 
Table 1. Payoff matrix of the social dilemma and the competitive conditions. 542 
 543 
 544 
 545 
19 | P a g e  
 
References  546 
 547 
Amici, F., Aureli, F., Mundry, R., Sánchez-Amaro, A., Barroso, A., Ferretti, J., & Call, J. (2014). 548 
Calculated reciprocity? A comparative test with six primate species. Primates, 55, 447-457.  549 
Amici, F., Aureli, F., & Call, J. (2008). Fission-fusion dynamics, behavioral flexibility, and 550 
inhibitory control in primates. Current Biology, 18, 1415-1419. 551 
Amici, F., Visalberghi, E., & Call, J. (2014). Lack of prosociality in great apes, capuchin monkeys 552 
and spider monkeys: convergent evidence from two different food distribution tasks. 553 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 281, 20141699. 554 
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211, 1390-1396.  555 
Baayen, R., Davidson, D., & Bates, D. (2008). Mixed-effects modelling with crossed random 556 
effects for subjects and items. Journal of Memory and Language, 59, 390-412.  557 
Barr, D., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. (2013). Random effects structure for confirmatory 558 
hypothesis testing: keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and Language, 68, 255-278.  559 
Bates, D. (2010). lme4: Mixed-effects modeling with R. http://lme4.r-forge.r-project.org/book. 560 
Benenson, J., Pascoe, J., & Radmore, N. (2007). Children's altruistic behavior in the dictator 561 
game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28, 168-175. 562 
Beran, M., & Evans, T. (2006). Maintenance of delay of gratification by four chimpanzees (Pan 563 
troglodytes): the effects of delayed reward visibility, experimenter presence, and extended 564 
delay intervals. Behavioural Processes, 73, 315-324. 565 
Blake, P., Rand, D., Tingley, D., & Warneken, F. (2015). The shadow of the future promotes 566 
cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma for children. Scientific reports, 5, 14559. 567 
Bohnet, I., & Frey, B. (1999). The sound of silence in prisoner's dilemma and dictator 568 
games. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 38, 43-57. 569 
Bouas, K., & Komorita, S. (1996). Group discussion and cooperation in social 570 
dilemmas. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 1144-1150. 571 
Boucher, D. (1988). The biology of mutualism: ecology and evolution. Oxford, UK: Oxford 572 
University Press. 573 
20 | P a g e  
 
Brosnan, S., Parrish, A., Beran, M., Flemming, T., Heimbauer, L., Talbot, C., Lambeth, S., 574 
Schapiro, S., & Wilson, B. (2011). Responses to the assurance game in monkeys, apes, and 575 
humans using equivalent procedures. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 576 
3442-3447. 577 
Brosnan, S., Silk, J., Henrich, J., Mareno, M., Lambeth, S., & Schapiro, S. (2009). Chimpanzees 578 
(Pan troglodytes) do not develop contingent reciprocity in an experimental task. Animal 579 
Cognition, 12, 587-597.  580 
Brownell, C., Iesue, S., Nichols, S., & Svetlova, M. (2013). Mine or yours? Development of 581 
sharing in toddlers in relation to ownership understanding. Child Development, 84, 906-920.  582 
Bueno-Guerra, N., Leiva, D., Colell, M. & Call, J. (2016).  Do sex and age affect strategic behavior 583 
and inequity aversion in children?. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 150, 285–300. 584 
Bullinger, A., Wyman, E., Melis, A., & Tomasello, M. (2011a). Coordination of chimpanzees (Pan 585 
troglodytes) in a stag hunt game. International Journal of Primatology, 32, 1296-1310. 586 
Bullinger, A., Melis, A., & Tomasello, M. (2011b). Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, prefer individual 587 
over collaborative strategies towards goals. Animal Behaviour, 82, 1135-1141. 588 
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton, 589 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 590 
Clutton-Brock, T. (2009). Cooperation between non-kin in animal societies. Nature, 462, 51-57.  591 
Cohen, T., Wildschut, T., & Insko, C. (2010). How communication increases interpersonal 592 
cooperation in mixed-motive situations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 39-50. 593 
Cooper, R., DeJong, D., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. (1996). Cooperation without reputation: 594 
experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games. Games and Economic Behavior, 12, 595 
187-218. 596 
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual review of psychology, 31, 169-193. 597 
Dal Bó, P., & Fréchette, G. (2011). The evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: 598 
Experimental evidence. The American Economic Review, 101, 411-429. 599 
Duffy, J., & Feltovich, N. (2002). Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental 600 
comparison of observation and cheap talk. Games and Economic Behavior, 38, 1-27.  601 
21 | P a g e  
 
Duguid, S., Wyman, E., Bullinger, A., Herfurth-Majstorovic, K., & Tomasello, M. (2014). 602 
Coordination strategies of chimpanzees and human children in a Stag Hunt game. Proceedings 603 
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 281, 20141973.  604 
Dugatkin, L. (1988). Do guppies play TIT FOR TAT during predator inspection visits?. Behavioral 605 
Ecology and Sociobiology, 23, 395-399. 606 
Field, A. (2005) Discovering Statistics using SPSS. London, UK: Sage Publications.  607 
Gilby, I., Machanda, Z., Mjungu, D., Rosen, J., Muller, M., Pusey, A., & Wrangham, R. (2015). 608 
“Impact hunters” catalyse cooperative hunting in two wild chimpanzee communities. 609 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 370, 20150005  610 
Grueneisen, S., & Tomasello, M. (2016). Children coordinate in a recurrent social dilemma by 611 
taking turns and along dominance asymmetries. Developmental Psychology, 53, 265-273.  612 
Hamann, K., Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Children’s developing commitments to 613 
joint goals. Child Development, 83, 137-145. 614 
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., & McElreath, R. (2001). In 615 
search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. The American 616 
Economic Review, 91, 73-78. 617 
Henrich, J., & Silk, J. (2013). Interpretative problems with chimpanzee ultimatum 618 
game. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110, E3049. 619 
Horner, V., Carter, J., Suchak, M., & de Waal, F. (2011). Spontaneous prosocial choice by 620 
chimpanzees. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 13847-13851. 621 
Jensen, K. (2016). Chapter Seven-The Prosocial Primate—A Critical Review. Advances in the 622 
Study of Behavior, 48, 387-441. 623 
Jensen, K., Call, J. & Tomasello, M. (2007). Chimpanzees are rational maximizers in an ultimatum 624 
game. Science, 318, 107-109.  625 
Jensen, K., Call, J. & Tomasello, M. (2013). Chimpanzee responders still behave like rational 626 
maximizers. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110, E1837.  627 
Kiyonari, T., Tanida, S., & Yamagishi, T. (2000). Social Exchange and reciprocity: confusion or a 628 
heuristic?. Evolution and Human Behavior, 21, 411-427. 629 
22 | P a g e  
 
Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., Striano, T., & Tomasello, M. (2006). 12-and 18-month-olds point 630 
to provide information for others. Journal of Cognition and Development, 7, 173-187.  631 
Matsumoto, D., Haan, N., Yabrove, G., Theodorou, P., & Carney, C. (1986). Preschoolers' moral 632 
actions and emotions in Prisoner's Dilemma. Developmental Psychology, 22, 663. 633 
Maynard Smith, J., & Szathmary, E. (1995). The major transitions in evolution. Oxford, UK: 634 
Oxford University Press. 635 
Melis, A., Grocke, P., Kalbitz, J., & Tomasello, M. (2016). One for you, one for me humans’ 636 
unique turn-taking skills. Psychological Science, 0956797616644070. 637 
Melis, A., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Chimpanzees recruit the best collaborators. 638 
Science, 311, 1297-1300.  639 
Melis, A., Hare, B. & Tomasello, M. (2008). Do chimpanzees reciprocate received favours?. 640 
Animal Behaviour, 76, 951-962.  641 
Melis, A., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Chimpanzees coordinate in a negotiation game. 642 
Evolution and Human Behaviour, 30, 381-392.  643 
Melis, A., Warneken, F., Jensen, K., Schneider, A., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Chimpanzees 644 
help conspecifics obtain food and non-food items. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 645 
Biological Sciences, 278, 1405-1413. 646 
Nakagawa, S., & Schielzeth, H. (2013). A general and simple method for obtaining R2 from 647 
generalized linear mixed‐effects models. Methods in Ecology and Evolution, 4, 133-142. 648 
Nakagawa, S., Johnson, P., & Schielzeth, H. (2017). The coefficient of determination R2 and 649 
intra-class correlation coefficient from generalized linear mixed-effects models revisited and 650 
expanded. Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 14, 20170213. 651 
Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1994). A strategy to win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat 652 
in the Prioner’s Dilemma. Nature, 364, 56-58.  653 
Proctor, D., Williamson, R., De Waal, F., & Brosnan, S. (2013). Chimpanzees play the ultimatum 654 
game. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110, 2070-2075. 655 
Raihani, N., & Bshary, R. (2011). Resolving the iterated prisoner’s dilemma: theory and 656 
reality. Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 24, 1628-1639. 657 
Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. (1965). Prisoner's dilemma: a study in conflict and cooperation. 658 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 659 
23 | P a g e  
 
Rosati, A., Stevens, J., Hare, B., & Hauser, M. (2007). The evolutionary origins of human 660 
patience: temporal preferences in chimpanzees, bonobos, and human adults. Current 661 
Biology, 17, 1663-1668. 662 
Sánchez-Amaro, A., Duguid, S., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2016). Chimpanzees coordinate in a 663 
snowdrift game. Animal Behaviour, 116, 61-74. 664 
Sánchez-Amaro, A., Duguid, S., Call, J. & Tomasello, M. (2017). Chimpanzees, bonobos and 665 
children successfully coordinate in conflict situations. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 666 
Biological Sciences, 284, 20170259.  667 
Schäfer, M., Haun, D., & Tomasello, M. (2015). Fair is not fair everywhere. Psychological 668 
science, 26, 1252-1260. 669 
Schmelz, M., Grueneisen, S., Kabalak, A., Jost, J. & Tomasello, M. (2017). Chimpanzees return 670 
favors at a personal cost. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114, 201700351. 671 
Silk, J., Brosnan, S., Vonk, J., Henrich, J., Povinelli, D., Richardson, A., Lambeth, S., Mascaro, J. & 672 
Schapiro, S. (2005). Chimpanzees are indifferent to the welfare of unrelated group 673 
members. Nature, 437, 1357. 674 
Smith, P., & Silberberg, A. (2010). Rational maximizing by humans (Homo sapiens) in an 675 
ultimatum game. Animal Cognition, 13, 671-677. 676 
Stephens, D., McLinn, C., & Stevens, J. (2002). Discounting and reciprocity in an iterated 677 
prisoner's dilemma. Science, 298, 2216-2218. 678 
Sterelny, K. (2016). Cooperation, culture, and conflict. The British Journal for the Philosophy of 679 
Science, 67, 31-58.  680 
Susan McClung, J., Placì, S., Bangerter, A., Clément, F. & Bshary, R. (2017). The language of 681 
cooperation: shared intentionality drives variation in helping as a function of group membership. 682 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 284, 20171682.  683 
Sudgen, R. (1986). The economics of rights, cooperation and welfare. Oxford, UK: Basil 684 
Blackwell. 685 
Tennie, C., Jensen, K., & Call, J. (2016). The nature of prosociality in chimpanzees. Nature 686 
Communications, 7. 687 
Tomasello, M. (2016). A Natural History of Human Morality. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University 688 
Press. 689 
24 | P a g e  
 
Tomasello, M., Melis, A., Tennie, C., Wyman, E., & Herrmann, E. (2012). Two key steps in the 690 
evolution of human cooperation: the interdependence hypothesis. Current Anthropology, 53, 691 
673-692. 692 
Tucker, A. (1950). A two-person dilemma. Readings in games and information, 7-8. 693 
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